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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a privacy preserving en-
coding framework for identification applications covering biomet-
rics, physical object security and the Internet of Things (IoT). The
proposed framework is based on a sparsifying transform, which
consists of a trained linear map, an element-wise nonlinearity,
and privacy amplification. The sparsifying transform and privacy
amplification are not symmetric for the data owner and data user.
We demonstrate that the proposed approach is closely related
to sparse ternary codes (STC), a recent information-theoretic
concept proposed for fast approximate nearest neighbor (ANN)
search in high dimensional feature spaces that being machine
learning in nature also offers significant benefits in comparison
to sparse approximation and binary embedding approaches. We
demonstrate that the privacy of the database outsourced to a
server as well as the privacy of the data user are preserved at a
low computational cost, storage and communication burdens.
Keywords—privacy; identification; sparse approximation;
transform learning; ambiguization; clustering.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Identification and ANN Search
Many modern applications such as biometrics, digital phys-
ical object security and data generated by connected objects
in the IoT require privacy preserving identification of a query
with respect to a given dataset. Practically, the identification
problem is based on an ANN search when a list of indices
corresponding to the NN items is returned. At the final
refinement stage, the list can be refined in a private setting
and a single index is declared as the identified one. The
identification problem faces the curse of dimensionality. For
this reason, the exact identification is replaced by a search of
list of closest items, i.e., one tries to trade-off the accuracy of
identification by the search complexity. In recent years, many
methods providing efficient ANN solutions for multi-billion
entry datasets were proposed and we named some of them
without pretending to be exhaustive in our overview [1]–[3].
B. Search in Privacy Preserving Settings: Main Considerations
Due to the massive amount of data, modern distributed
storage and computing facilities, many ANN problems are con-
sidered in a setting where the data user outsources his datasets
by applying the corresponding protection measures to third
parties (servers) possessing powerful storage, communications
and computing facilities. The need for data protection comes
from many perspectives related to the cost of data collection,
data as a ”product” that represents a great value in the era
of machine learning, which can be used to train and prune
new and existing machine learning tools. Moreover, the server
might want to discover some hidden relationships in the data.
Finally, the non-renewable nature of some features such as
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of the proposed model.
for example biometrics, which being disclosed once, do not
represent any more a value for the related security applications.
The data users (clients), who by hypothesis poses some query,
related to those stored in the databases of the data owners,
wish to identify them by obtaining an index/indices of the
closest items in the data owner datasets. However, the client
does not want to disclose his query to the server completely
for privacy reasons. Therefore, it is assumed that both the data
owner and clients attempt at protecting their data from server
side analysis, which is assumed to be honest but curious.
More particularly, the server might attempt: (a) to try to find
relationships between entries in the database of the data owner,
(b) reconstruct an individual entry of the data owner database
or a common representatives or centroids for the clusters, (c)
reconstruct the query of clients and (d) cluster multiple queries
from the same client or from multiple ones thus establishing
the group interests based on the similarity of probes. Curious
clients might be also interested to discover more information
about the structure of database by exploring the NN around one
or multiple probes. Additionally, one can envision collaborative
clients who might aggregate the results for multiple queries.
C. Our contribution
This paper presents a new privacy preserving strategy to the
ANN search problem based on a recently proposed concept
of Sparse Ternary Codes [1], [4]. Our main contribution
consists in a novel formulation of database protection based
on a STC representation with the addition of ambiguization
noise to prevent database analysis and a novel formulation
of the query mechanism based on sending the positions
of non-zero components in the query sparse representation
along with the fraction of ambiguous positions to prevent
the reconstruction from query and collaborative processing of
queries. Our approach differs from existing privacy protection
based on quantized embedding [2], [5] and attribute based
[6] techniques. It has strong information-theoretic foundations
and demonstrated higher coding gain with respect to binarized
embedding methods [4].
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Our setup is quite generic and we assume that as an input
we might have raw data, extracted features using any known
hand crafted methods, aggregated local descriptors based on
BoW, FV, VLAD [7]–[9], etc, or intermediate or last layers
of deep nets [10]. Before we provide the input to the server
we preprocess it by passing it via the sparsifying transform
and thresholding it thus producing STC.1 The next stage
is an ambiguation that consists in the addition of selective
noise components to the zero positions in the sparse data
representation (Fig. 1). As a sparsifying transform we use an
efficient learning method based on the sparsified Procrustes
problem formulation [11] in contrast to a fixed transform
used in [1], [4]. The resulting data are stored on the public
server. The client, who possesses some query, sends a set
of non-zero positions after sparsification of the query to
the server and expects that the server will return a set of
corresponding indices corresponding to positive and negative
non-zero components. To ambiguise the server, the data user
also adds a certain portion of false positions to the query
and keeps their indices. The search complexity of the server
is logarithmic in terms of the number of stored items times
the number of non-zero positions in the sparsified query. This
also determines the returned file size to the client. Due to the
efficient sparse representation, the amount of returned data is
minimized while preserving the efficiency of the data structure
representation. At the final stage, the data user disregards
the lists corresponding to false positions and aggregates the
remaining lists for the corresponding positions producing the
final ANN list.
D. Notation and Definitions
Throughout this paper, superscript (.)T stands for the
transpose and (.)† stands for pseudo-inverse. Vectors and
matrices are denoted by boldface lower-case (x) and upper-
case (X) letters, respectively. We consider the same notation
for a random vector x and its realization. The difference should
be clear from the context. xi denotes the i-th entry of vector x.
For a matrix X, x(j) denotes the j-th column of X. Also, we
use the notations [N ] for the set {1, 2, 3, ..., N} and card (S)
for the cardinality of a set S.
Definition 1. The support of a vector x ∈ RN is the index set
of its nonzero entries, i.e., supp (x) := {n ∈ [N ] : xn 6= 0}.
Definition 2. Given a subset E of a space X , the indicator
function 1E : X → R is defined by setting 1E (x) equal to 1
for x ∈ E and equal to 0 for x /∈ E .
E. Outline of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the identification problem is defined. We then
propose our framework in Section III. Section IV evaluates
the privacy imposed by our framework. Finally, conclusions
are drawn in Section V.
II. IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
Consider that M (raw) feature vectors are stored in the
database X = [ x(1) · · · x(m) · · · x(M) ], where each
feature vector x(m),m ∈ [M ] from a set X ⊂ RN is a random
vector with distribution p (x) and bounded variance σ2x.
1 It should be noted that even higher flexibility is possible for multilevel
quantization.
The query (probe) y(m) ∈ RN is the noisy version
of x(m), i.e., y(m) = x(m) + z, where we assume
z ∈ RN is a Gaussian noise vector with distribution
N (0,Σz = σ2zIN). Provided that the additive noise z is in-
dependent of data, for large N the law of large numbers states
that 1N ‖y(m)− x(m)‖22 → 1NE
[
zT z
] ' σ2z, ∀m ∈ [M ].
Therefore, for an enrollment vector x(m) stored at database
with high probability query vector y(m) will be in an N -
dimensional sphere of radius
√
Nσz and centered at x(m).
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Sparse Representation and Encoding
The intrinsic information content of feature vectors, like
other real-world signals, is much smaller than their lengths.
So we are interested in approximating them by sparse vectors.
Many signals x(m) ∈ RN may be represented as a linear
combination of a small number of columns (words) from
a frame2 (dictionary) D ∈ RN×L according to the sparse
approximation model. Therefore, x(m)= Da(m)+ex, where
ex ∈ RN is approximation error, a(m) ∈ RL is sparse with
‖a(m)‖0  L, in which ‖a(m)‖0 := card(supp (a(m))). The
general problem formulation of this sparse coding problem for
a fixed dictionary can be expressed as:
â(m)= arg min
a(m)∈AL
‖x(m)−Da(m)‖22 + λΩ (a(m)) ,∀m ∈ [M ] ,
(1)
where A is an alphabet of sparse representations, λ is a
regularization parameter and Ω (.) is sparsity-inducing regu-
larization function. However, the sparse coding with respect
to a (m) is an inverse problem in nature and known to be NP-
hard. This problem can be solved approximately by greedy
or relaxation algorithms, but these only provide the correct
solution under certain conditions, which are often violated in
real world applications. Furthermore, they are computationally
expensive in practice, particularly for large-scale problems.
In this paper, we use a transform model [12] for the
sparse representation of vectors at enrollment and identification
phases. This model suggests that a feature vector x(m) ∈ RN
is approximately sparsifiable using a transform W ∈ RL×N ,
that is Wx(m) = a(m) + ea, where a(m) ∈ RL is sparse,
i.e., ‖a(m)‖0  L, and ea ∈ RL is the representation error
of the feature vector or residual in the transform domain. The
sparse coding problem for this model is a direct constraint
projection problem. The general problem formulation, also
known as sparse approximation, is as follows:
â(m)= arg min
a(m)∈AL
‖Wx(m)−a(m)‖22 +λΩ (a(m)),∀m ∈ [M ] .
(2)
Note that the residual and therefore the sparse represen-
tation a(m) is not constrained to lie in the range space of
W. Furthermore, since it is a direct problem, for any of the
two important regularizers Ω (.) = ‖.‖0 or Ω (.) = ‖.‖1 has
closed-form solutions. In this paper, we consider l0-“norm” as
our sparsity-inducing penalty. In this case, the solution â(m) is
obtained exactly by hard-thresholding the projection Wx(m)
and keeping the Sx entries of the largest magnitudes, setting
the remaining low magnitude entries to zero. For this purpose,
2A set of L orthonormal vectors with vector dimensionality N equal to L
is said to form a basis set for that vector space. A frame of an inner product
space is a generalization of a basis of a vector space to sets that may be
linearly dependent.
we define an intermediate vector f(m) , Wx(m) ∈ RL
and denote by λx the Sx-th largest magnitude among the
set {|f1(m)|, ..., |fL(m)|}. Then the closed-form solution is
achieved by applying to f(m) a hard-thresholding operator,
which is defined as Hλx(f (m)) = 1|fl(m)|≥λxf(m),∀m ∈
[M ] ,∀l ∈ [L].
In [1], the authors show that Sparse Ternary Coding
(STC) outperformed classical binary hashing. Therefore, by
considering the alphabet of sparse representation vectors as
A = {−1, 0,+1}, we apply the ternary hash mapping to
Hλx (Wx (m)) as:
a (m) , Tλx (Wx (m)) ∈ {−1, 0,+1}L, ∀m ∈ [M ] , (3)
where Tλx (Wx (m)) = sign (Hλx (Wx (m))). We denote,
therefore, the space of public storage as AL×M . For simplicity,
through out this paper, we denote by S ⊂ XN the space of
vectors in the signal (original) domain and by T ⊂ AL the
space of vectors in the transform domain. Also, we denote by
ψ(.) the operator Tλ (.) in general.
Note that given the transform matrix W and sparse fea-
ture code a(m), the recovered feature vector is then simply
x̂(m) = W†a(m). We are especially interested in square, i.e.,
L = M , and over-complete, i.e., L > M , transform matrices.
In this paper, we just address the square sparsifying transform.
Obviously, the projection Tλx (.) introduces a certain loss
of information. In order to measure the difference between
the original data x(m) and the corresponding reconstructed
data x̂(m) via encoded values a(m), we use the mean
squared error (MSE) as our distortion measure. Also, since
our points are random vectors, the distortion measure is given
as D (x(m), x̂(m)) = 1N E [‖x(m)− x̂(m)‖2] . Sparsity level
Sx should be chosen such to the specific distortion level.
Our sparsifying transform learning is based on the classical
Procrustes matrix problem [13]. That is, we seek an orthonor-
mal matrix W ∈ RN×N , which most closely transforms a
given matrix X ∈ RN×M into a sparse matrix A ∈ RN×M .
Therefore, using the Frobenius norm, the problem is to find
W minimizing ‖WX−A‖2F subject to WWT = I. For the
square sparsifying transform, it can be shown that W = UVT ,
where the columns in U and V are left-hand and right-
hand singular vectors for AXT . Note that, in this case W†
is simply WT . Our algorithm for the above minimization
problem alternates between solving for A = ψ (WX) (sparse
coding step) and W = UVT (transform update step), whilst
the other variables are kept fixed.
In our framework, we set the sparsifying transform matrix
W to be provided, i.e., only authorized parties have access
to it. However, even if W is compromised, our ambiguization
mechanism prevents to reconstruct x from a. In the general
case, the matrix W is applied selectively to the data and
shared only between the concerned parties. The plurality of
different matrices {W} is ensured by a key-base initialization
of the sparsified Procrustes procedure, i.e., W(0) = f (K).
We choose f (K) = UK , where UK is unitary matrix
obtained form UKΣKVTK = K. In general, given the database
X ∈ RN×M and the shared key matrix K ∈ RL×N as initial
seed for generating W, the public sparsifying transform matrix
W ∈ RL×N can be easily learnt and accessed by authorized
parties. Next, given λx the encoded ambiguized data can be
shared in public storage. Before our discussion on the imposed
ambiguization for the server in Sec. IV, note that even if the
server has the clean version of the transformed data, since it
has no access to the shared key matrix K, it cannot reconstruct
the original data by the inverse projection. In Sec. IV, we will
propose a simple method such that given the disclosed private
key K and public sparsifying transform W at the server, it is
infeasible to learn the structure of data.
B. Link to Quantized Embedding Methods
Many methods like [5] propose a similar privacy preserving
framework based on:
a (m) = Q (Wx (m) + ∆) ,∀m ∈ [M ] , (4)
where Q(.) stands for a scalar quantizer and ∆ is a dither that
might be treated as a secret key and A = {−1,+1}. There are
several fundamental differences between (3) and (4):
- Transform W: In (4), W is a dimensionality reduction
transform with random entries. In (3), the transform W
is considered as an over-complete transform that extends
the dimensions. Moreover, W in (3) is trained using
the described sparsifying Procrustes problem to ensure
an optimal sparse representational that is information
preserving in general, whereas W in (4) might pre-
serve the distances only under certain conditions of the
Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma.
- Codes a: In (4), the codes are dense and binary, whereas
in (3) the codes are sparse and ternary, which form a basis
of our ambiguization framework.
C. Identification Stage
At the identification stage, given a query vector y ∈ RN ,
sparsifying transform matrix W and sparsity level Sy , vector
b (m) , Tλy (Wy (m)) ∈ {−1, 0,+1}L is calculated. We
consider two hypothesis for our query, as follows:{ H1 : y = x (m) + z , ∀m ∈ [M ] ,
H0 : y = x´ , (5)
where x´ ∈ RN is a query vector out of the database. The block
diagram of our model is depicted in Fig. 1.
D. Practical Decoding
Our final decision is based on the γ-NN decoder, which
seeks all {a (m) ,m ∈ [M ]} NNs in the radius γL from the
query y in order to produce a list of possible candidates as:
L (y) = {m ∈ [M ] : dA (a (m) ,b) ≤ γL} , where dA (., .)
is our similarity measure in space A. We consider two de-
coding schemes, private and public decoding. In the private
decoding, the client discloses his probe sparse representation,
i.e., Tλy (Wy (m)), to the server completely. While in the
public scheme, the client sends only positions of non-zero
components in the sparse representation of his probe along
with a fraction of ambiguous positions as p.
E. Isometric Mapping
In general, for a set X , if we can introduce a metric
(or distance function) dX on X × X which obeying four
fundamental axioms [14], then a pair (X , dX ) is said to be a
metric space. In our framework we take the set of all ordered
N -tuples of S as our original data, and the set of all ordered
L-tuples of T as our transformed data. Let S = (S, dS),
T = (T , dT ) be metric spaces, then a mapping ψ(.) of S
into T is said to be isometric, if ψ(.) preserves distances.
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Fig. 2: The relation between the required sparsity level Sy
normalized to code length L=N versus the variance of noise
σ2z normalized to σ
2
x in order to preserve distances in the
ternary sparse domain, for M = 20000 i.i.d random vectors
with mean zero and variance σ2x, with three different dimension
of feature vectors N =500, 1000, 1500 and two sparsity level
Sx=10, 40.
We are interested to preserve distances by our encoding
scheme, i.e., there exists a sufficiently small  > 0 such that
for all m ∈ [M ], we have:
(1− ) dS (x (m) ,y (m))
≤ dT (ψ (x (m)) , ψ (y (m))) ≤
(1 + ) dS (x (m) ,y (m)). (6)
Assuming our metric is induced by the Euclidean norm, we
have dS (x,y) = ‖x− y‖2, dT (a,b) = ‖a− b‖2. Therefore,
noting ‖x(m)− y(m)‖22 = ‖z‖22 ' Nσ2z and considering a
ternary sparse encoding, we have:
(1− ) ‖z‖22 ≤ ‖a(m)− b (m) ‖22 ≤ (1 + ) ‖z‖22. (7)
Before discussion on the above inequality, we consider
lower and upper bounds of distances, which we will use in
Section IV. In the original signal domain, considering query
vector y in the general case, the lower and upper bounds of
distances between the vector x (m) ,m ∈ [M ] in the database
and query y can be given as Nσ2z ' ‖z‖22 ≤ ‖x(m)− y‖22 ≤
‖x(m)‖22 + ‖y‖22 ' N
(
σ2x + σ
2
y
)
.
In the transform domain with the ternary encoding, we
have Wx(m) = Tλx (Wx(m)) + ex = a(m) + ex and
Wy(m) = Tλy (Wy(m)) + ey = b(m) + ey, where ex
and ey are approximation errors of the ternary hash mapping
corresponding to x(m) and y(m), respectively. Therefore, the
upper bound on ‖a (m)−b(m)‖2 is given as:
‖a(m)−b(m)‖22 ≤‖W‖2F ‖x(m)−y(m)‖22+‖ex−ey‖22. (8)
However, the above upper bound is not tight, since it does
not consider properties of vectors in the transform domain.
Also, it is based on the error terms of approximation, which
may not give a clear sense of the upper bound at first
glance. Considering the sparse ternary property of vectors,
we have ‖a (m)− b (m) ‖22 = ‖a (m) ‖22 + ‖b (m) ‖22 −
2〈a (m) ,b (m)〉 and |〈a (m) ,b (m)〉| ≤ min{Sx, Sy}, the
lower and upper bounds on distance are given as:
Sx + Sy − 2 min{Sx, Sy}
≤ ‖a (m)− b (m) ‖22 ≤
Sx + Sy + 2 min{Sx, Sy}. (9)
This means that the upper bound on distances in the transform
domain are restricted by sparsity levels.
In order to preserve distances, given the variance of
the measurement noise σ2z and sparsity level Sx
3, we have
3Sparsity level Sx obtained based on the desired distortion level imposed
by sparse approximation.
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Fig. 3: Impact of the variance of measurement noise
on the components of Hλx(Wx(m)) and corresponding
Hλy(Wy(m)), for randomly selected m∈ [500], with Sx =
Sy = 10, N = L = 128, σ2x = 1. Fig. (3a), Fig. (3c) and
Fig. (3e) represent the components of Hλx(Wx (m)) and
Hλy(Wy (m)) with σ
2
z = 0.15, σ
2
z = 0.2 and σ
2
z = 0.4,
respectively. Fig. (3b), Fig. (3d) and Fig. (3f) indicate the
corresponding errors.
to set (1− ) (Nσ2z) ≤ Sx + Sy − 2〈a (m) , b (m)〉 ≤
(1 + )
(
Nσ2z
)
. So, the smallest integer sparsity level for
approximation of noisy query y (m) is given as Sy =
bNσ2z + 2〈a (m) , b (m)〉 − Sx c. Note that if z = 0, then
Sx = Sy since in this condition a (m) = b (m), therefore
〈a (m) ,b (m)〉 = Sx. However, the above equation is implicit
since b (m) depends on the sparsity level Sy , and vice versa.
But, we can obtain it recursively. Fig. 2 depicts the required
sparsity level Sy in order to preserve distances in the signal
and transform domains. Due to the lack of space, we cannot
provide our discussion about thresholding functions Hλx and
Hλy as well as our analytic approach for distortion analysis.
The more detailed analytic results will be presented in an
extended version of this paper.
IV. AMBIGUIZATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide our results for ambiguization of
public storage. In order to make our ambiguization approach
more clear, first we discuss our model without ambiguization
noise. In Fig. 3, we illustrates impact of measurement noise
on the sparse approximation with a hard-thresholding operator
for small sparsity levels Sx = Sy = 10 4. We see that
small measurement noise just changes the magnitude of the
components, while the indices of sparse components gradually
miss by increasing the variance of the noise.
A. Ambiguization in Sparsified Transform Domain
In this section, we propose a simple scheme for imposing
ambiguization at the server. In previous sections, we use T as
space of L-dimensional vectors in the transform domain. Let
U ,V ⊆ T be two subspaces such that T = U + V . So, every
vector a ∈ T has at least one expression as a = u + v,u ∈
U ,v ∈ V . If we have U ∩ V = {0}, then every vector a ∈ T
has the unique expression a = u + v,u ∈ U ,v ∈ V and
we write T = U ⊕ V . Also, T is called the direct sum of
U and V . Now, let U be the space of non-zero components
4The same sparsity levels are not optimal to preserve distances. We just
intend to make sense of the influence of measurement noise on clean data.
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Fig. 4: Impact of ambiguization at (a) Server side and (b)
Client side, for two different desired radius of ‖x− y‖2 =
N = 2.1, 5.8 in the original domain with different ambigu-
ization noise sparsity levels Sns .
of T and V be the space of zero components of T . The idea
of our ambiguization method is to set ambiguization noise n
such that n ∈ V . Furthermore, since (T , 〈., .〉) is an inner
product space and V = U⊥ , {v ∈ V : 〈u, v〉 = 0,∀u ∈ U},
T = U ⊕U⊥ is orthogonal direct sum of U and U⊥. It is clear
that dim T = L, dim U = Sx and dim U⊥ = L − Sx. We
denote by Sns the sparsity level of ambiguization noise at the
server. Note that 0 ≤ Sns ≤ L− Sx.
Intuitively, when the number of choices increases, the
server uncertainty increases, and so does the entropy measure
proportionally to log2
(Sx + Sns
Sx
)
. By adding ambiguization
noise n to the zero components of the sparse representation
of the clean data, we increase uncertainty at the server side.
Clearly, we have a trade-off between utility and privacy. By
setting sparsity levels such that Sx → 0 and Sns → L we reach
maximal privacy and loose our utility in the sense of a stable
reconstruction, correct decision and also sparse representation.
On the other hand, by choosing Sx → L and Sns → 0 we
reach maximal utility, however, we loose our privacy. However,
it should be noted that authorized client shares a common
secrecy with the data owner, i.e., he knows a set of secret
positions in contrast to the server. Therefore, the addition of
extra false components in the orthogonal positions does not
harm the client as much as the server.
Fig. 4 depicts the effect of ambiguization on the distances at
the server side and client side. Considering no ambiguization
noise on the sparse representation of public data, the solid
”blue” and ”black” lines illustrate our desired preserved dis-
tances corresponding to ‖x − y‖ = 2.1 and ‖x − y‖ = 5.8,
respectively. Hence, on the client side, we cannot recover any
information about the NNs hash signals that are far apart,
since our approach only preserves distances up to a radius,
as determined by the sparsity level of the approximation. As it
is shown, by imposing ambiguization noise, all distances from
the server viewpoint go to constant value, i.e., all vectors in
the public domain seem equally from the server standpoint.
However, from the client side we can effectively preserve dis-
tances up to the designed radius, just by computing distances
on non-zero components of the sparse representation of the
query, i.e., on supp
(
Tλy (Wy(m))
)
. Note that, regarding to
our discussion in Sec. III, the upper bound on distances in the
transform domain is restricted by sparsity levels.
In [2] the authors listed potential threats under the ‘honest
but curious’ model. According to our previous discussions
the threat S1 in [2] precluded. In order to address threat
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Fig. 5: Estimated PDFs of pairwise distances in transform
domain with different sparsity ratios and privacy leak estimates
D(P1‖P2) for the corresponding cases.
S2. i.e., clustering the database vectors from a (m) ,∀m ∈
[M ], we generate four 512-dimensional i.i.d. vectors with
distribution N (0,1) and 1000 512-dimensional i.i.d. vectors
with distribution N (0,0.1). Then we add each 250 (out of
1000) low variance vectors to the four high variance ones
(schematically shown in Fig. 6). This results in a database of
1000 vectors adhering to four clusters. By defining sparsity
ratios αx = Sx/L and βx = Sns/L, and denoting by
Pintra and Pinter as probability density functions (PDFs) of
‘intra-cluster’ and ‘inter-cluster’ of distances, respectively, we
intend to introduce a Kullback-Leibler divergence privacy leak
measure. To this end, we define distribution P1 as mixture of
Pintra and Pinter, that is, P1 = αx Pintra + (1− αx)Pinter,
0 ≤ αx ≤ 1. Also, we denote the Gaussian distribution
N (µ2, σ22) by P2, such that µ2 and σ22 are the mean and
variance of P1, respectively. Therefore, the privacy leak mea-
sure can be defined by the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD)
as D (P1‖P2) = αxD (Pintra‖P2) + (1− αx)D (Pinter‖P2),
where D (P1‖P2) = EP1
[
log P1P2
]
. Now, our privacy leak
constraint can be expressed as D (P1‖P2) ≤ δ, where δ deter-
mines the allowable privacy leakage from database clustering.
If all inter-class and intra-class distances follow the same
distribution (close to Gaussian for large N or L), then no
clustering algorithm can differentiate them on the server side.
In the same way, the KLD D (P1‖P2) will tend to zero.
In Fig. 5, we illustrate the estimated PDFs of pairwise
distances in the transform domain. The ‘solid lines’ indicate
Pintra and Pinter with different sparsity ratio βx. As evident,
by imposing ambiguization noise, the distributions Pintra and
Pinter become unimodal Gaussian, therefore, the curious server
cannot cluster database. Also, it is shown that by increasing
the sparsity ratio of approximation, αx, we have to increase the
sparsity ratio of ambiguization, βx, in order to keep our privacy
protection. The ‘dashed lines’ indicate the corresponding Gaus-
sian distribution fit to each ‘solid’ plot. These figures clarify
our main intuition of defining the KL divergence as a privacy
protection measure in the ambiguized transform domain. Fig. 6
visualizes how our model behaves in practice. Another interest-
ing result is that k-means clustering will completely fail at the
server, provided D (P1‖P2) ≤ δ. If the curious server runs the
k-means scheme, the expected probability of correct clustering
will be 1k , which shows maximal achievable Shannon entropy
Original Domain Public Domain
ψ (Wx (m))
⊕
n
Fig. 6: Schematic visualization of ambiguization on correlated
clustered data used for Fig. 5.
for random guessing. In other words, the bin (label) assignment
at the server is completely random and server cannot learn the
structure of database.
Although in our framework we design the decoder to be in
the private domain, in order to address threats S3 and S4 of [2]
we generalize our framework and consider the decoder in the
public domain. Now, we briefly discuss our solution for this
scenario. In the public decoder scenario the data user (client
side) just sends the positions of interest to the server and server
returns lists of the vectors that have non-zero components for
each position. We denote by I ⊂ [L] the set of indices that the
user sends to the server such that card (I) = Sy +Snq , where
Snq is the number of ambiguized positions sent in addition
to the Sy interested positions. For request position l ∈ I,
the server returns L+ (l) = {m ∈ [M ] : al (m) = +1} and
L− (l) = {m ∈ [M ] : al (m) = −1}, where card (L+ (l)) '
card (L− (l)) ' 0.5M (αx + βx). So, for a database consist-
ing of M = 109 vectors with parameters Sy + Snq = 16
and αx+βx ≈ 0.03125, we need M (αx + βx)
(
Sy + Snq
) ≈
62 MB in order send back the lists to the user. To avoid the
communication overhead, the server can communicate only
the data for a short list after score aggregation. The data
user refines the list by rejecting the results for ambiguized
positions. To investigate the upper limit on clustering based
on k-means for the example above, we investigate the ratio
between the inter-class and intra-class distances for various
parameters. Assuming L = 256, Sx = 10 and σ2z = 0.15, we
provide the average distances in TABLE I, where αy = Sy/L
and βy = Snq/L. Defining d¯diag as the average of diagonal
entries and d¯off as the average of off-diagonal entries for
pairwise average distance matrices shown in TABLE I and
setting Sns = L − Sx, we plot the ratio of d¯off to d¯diag as a
function of
(
Sy + Snq
)
/L = αy+βy in Fig. 7. As evident, by
increasing Snq from 0 to L−Sy , the ratio d¯off/d¯diag converges
to 1, i.e., we reach maximal privacy when the query discloses
the positions to the server.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a novel approach for privacy preserving
identification based on a STC representation with ambiguiza-
tion noise. Our scheme preserves distances up to a radius,
as determined by the sparsity level of the approximation.
However, for distances greater than our desired radius, the
Euclidean distance between vectors in the transform domain
TABLE I: The upper limit of average distances between
clusters when a user sends the positions to the server.
βy ≈ 0.04 βy ≈ 0.16 βy ≈ 1− αy
β
x
≈
0
.0
4 0.9291 4.3568 4.1459 4.0621 1.8378 4.6563 4.4239 4.3569 4.4524 6.3278 5.9947 5.9989
4.2247 0.9042 4.2149 4.2231 4.5523 1.8273 4.5442 4.5446 6.3276 4.4522 6.3211 6.3193
4.1164 4.3912 0.9278 4.1577 4.3965 4.6747 1.8319 4.4322 5.9947 6.3211 4.4513 6.0044
4.0754 4.4043 4.1618 0.9238 4.3832 4.7061 4.4547 1.8776 5.9989 6.3193 6.0044 4.4505
β
x
≈
1
−
α
x 5.4068 7.0727 6.7268 6.6932 9.4215 10.4913 10.2535 10.2365 22.0792 22.6286 22.5188 22.5135
7.0680 5.4074 7.0168 6.9889 10.4819 9.4254 10.4600 10.4372 22.6286 22.0882 22.6180 22.5998
6.7350 7.0452 5.4027 6.7650 10.2609 10.4687 9.4181 10.2751 22.5188 22.6180 22.0790 22.5328
6.6914 7.0028 6.7587 5.4021 10.2311 10.4405 10.2758 9.4142 22.5135 22.5998 22.5328 22.0735
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Fig. 7: Privacy protection of database when probe discloses
the positions.
becomes independent of the distance between the vectors in the
original domain. Our method is generic, i.e., we have imposed
no restrictions on the input data. One of the main points
illustrated by this study is that we can share our database in the
public domain, while preserving data privacy and even ensure
the reconstruction of data for authorized users in contrast to
known methods. The results show that the curious server can-
not cluster the samples in the database, provided the Kullback-
Leibler privacy leak constraint is satisfied. Furthermore, we
proposed a public decoding method by introducing a novel
formulation of query mechanism based on sending non-zero
positions along with the ambiguous positions to server.
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